

~~SECRET~~CIA PROGRESS REPORT**CONFIDENTIAL**COPY NO. 2COPY: Annex 1 (Administration)  
Part 2, Section 7DRAFT: CBH Rewrite for DD/A Comment/Approval  
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In intelligence, security is the "sea around us", the atmosphere or habitat in which intelligence must live. Thus while security can be both burdensome and bothersome, it is also critically essential -- so essential that one cannot assay the effectiveness of CIA without assaying its security system.

And yet because security is enforced through restraints and controls, it hobbles the operation of an intelligence system just as it safeguards the end results. As a result the exercise of security in intelligence is partly an exercise in balance. How can the agency attain maximum effectiveness without relaxing its security restrictions? And how can the agency achieve maximum security without handcuffing itself in excessive restraints?

The dilemma is not easily resolved. Few agencies are more vulnerable than CIA to the damage that can be done by deliberate or by careless disclosure. For not only could penetration of CIA reveal U. S. practices in intelligence but it might also enable the Soviet to

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repair its own security system while mapping a more effective pattern of deception.

While security is in part an administrative problem, it is also a problem of people. For while investigations and guard systems, protective devices and document controls provide safeguards against security lapses, the ultimate problem in security is one of discretion among the agency's employees. Talkative employees are only scarcely less dangerous than disloyal ones. Thus a leakproof security system is dependent upon the leakproof security habits of agency personnel. But these habits must be inculcated and developed through indoctrination and security training. And as is so frequently the case with most good habits, security mindedness comes only with time.

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swollen in size. And while there have been few swollen in size. And while there have been few evidences of laxness in security procedures, there have been evidences of strain within the security system.

However, once the agency is stabilized and the press to

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With the expansion of covert operations, both abroad and in training grounds here, security has been pressed to devise and protect cover on these sensitive projects. In several instances these cover-plans have leaked and non-critical compromises have resulted. Meanwhile the agency has acquired valuable experience in the touchy processes of setting up cover and this experience is already reflected in the use of sounder, more effective techniques.

No major penetrations of CIA have been uncovered even though counter-intelligence is estimated to have forestalled several possible penetrations. And not once has the Congress, <sup>?</sup> (the press), or the public alleged the infiltration of CIA by subversives.

But this does not mean the agency is not troubled by soft spots. Indeed the primary weakness in CIA's security system results from a condition that can be remedied only by Congress. Within the metropolitan area of Washington alone, the agency currently occupies a total of [REDACTED] the last fifteen months. This dispersal constitutes an acute security hazard on which the Congress has already

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ascribes to CIA the role of U. S. "master spy" in almost total ignorance of its admissible coordinating functions. Consequently CIA is advertised almost exclusively as the U. S. "secret service".

This identity has left CIA with two alternative courses. Either it can ignore this popular tendency to dramatize it as the U. S. "cloak and dagger" center. Or it can seek to counteract this tendency by diverting emphasis from the covert to the overt side of its organization.

The latter alternative was the one favored in recommendations of the Dulles Report. Consequently in an effort to dim the lurid aura that provokes interest in its secret activities, CIA has sought to project itself to the public as an ordinary agency of government engaged in coordination of the U. S. national intelligence system. And although the original objective was a negative one, the agency has realized collateral benefits from this policy of diversion. For in admitting to its role in the intelligence system, CIA has helped reassure the public that policy is compounded on intelligence assembled from all sources in an orderly pattern.

We should refer to NSCIE 12 in this par, & indicate whether we are observing its provisions & what we think of it as a governing policy.

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Nevertheless there are those who still contend that overt activities are inseparable from acutely sensitive covert ones, that any information (whatever the intent) is potentially damaging to CIA. This traditional attitude probably permeates the intelligence community at large. It is apparent, therefore, that if CIA is to screen its covert activities by the overt, departmental intelligence agencies will have to be educated to the desirability of the technique.

Security is always a relative condition; it is never so good that it might not be better. Thus while CIA is neither apprehensive nor alarmed over the state of its security discipline, the agency is not satisfied that the security habits of its employees cannot be vastly improved.

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